Yemen and Bab al-Mandab: Strategic Options
Dr. Abubakr Batheeb
Director, European Centre for Public Opinion and Strategic Studies – Netherlands
The rapid developments in Yemen, particularly the strategic advance of the Houthi movement toward areas along the western coast that provide access to and strategic proximity to Bab al-Mandab, have assumed a prominent place in international media, political discourse, and strategic analysis. This is due not only to their direct impact on the geography of Yemen and the wider region, but also to their geopolitical implications for international shipping and the strategic interests of a broad range of regional and international powers.
Amid this escalation, the Houthis have sought to send reassuring messages to regional states through their contacts with Cairo, preceded by communication with U.S. President Donald Trump, as if to signal that they are capable of protecting international interests and securing freedom of navigation. At the same time, however, they appear to want the international community to recognize them as a de facto power and as an indispensable actor in any future arrangements concerning the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.
This development calls for a broader reading of the Middle Eastern landscape over recent months, particularly in light of the circumstances that enabled the Houthi movement to strengthen Iran’s political and military instruments. Although the broader international and regional trajectory has increasingly moved toward curbing Iranian influence and dismantling the network of militias and allied groups that Tehran has built across the region over several decades—from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and Yemen, and ultimately toward bringing the confrontation onto Iranian soil through U.S. and Israeli strikes targeting Tehran, its facilities, and its military capabilities—the geography of Yemen has produced a very different outcome.
The general trajectory suggested that Iran was entering a phase of strategic decline and that its model of building armed proxies beyond its borders was facing an existential test. Yet the most striking paradox is that the only significant strategic breakthrough Iran appears to have achieved during this period has not occurred in one of the capitals that historically constituted the depth of its regional project, but rather in Yemen.
The Houthi movement’s rapid advance toward the western coast and Bab al-Mandab, culminating in the seizure of Mokha and strategically important maritime positions, has given Tehran, through one of its principal regional allies, an opportunity to restore part of its ability to shape the geopolitical environment of the region.
The significance of this development lies in the fact that the Houthis are no longer merely an armed group engaged in an internal war on Yemeni territory. They are increasingly approaching a geographic position that allows them to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean.
If the Houthis succeed in consolidating their presence along the western coast and strengthening their military capabilities in the vicinity of Bab al-Mandab, Tehran will have achieved a gain extending well beyond Yemen. It would be able to exert indirect pressure on global trade and energy flows through an allied actor capable of targeting vessels, increasing the cost of maritime transport, and disrupting navigation.
The broader strategic significance becomes even clearer when considered alongside Iran’s pressure on the Strait of Hormuz. Its Houthi ally is developing an increasing capacity to exert pressure from the opposite side, at Bab al-Mandab. The two straits are not merely separate maritime passages; they constitute opposing gateways to the energy and trade geography surrounding the Arabian Peninsula and the wider world.
If Tehran succeeds—as appears increasingly to be the case—in keeping Hormuz under threat while Bab al-Mandab remains exposed to Houthi pressure, Iran does not necessarily need to physically close both straits. It is sufficient to make transit through them more dangerous, more costly, and less predictable. This is precisely what makes the current Houthi development different from previous rounds of conflict.
For years, Iranian influence in Yemen was viewed primarily as a means of exerting pressure on Saudi Arabia and exhausting it along its southern border. Today, however, the geography reached by the Houthis gives that instrument a much greater international value. The ability to influence one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, as well as an alternative route that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states could potentially rely on if navigation through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted, gives Iran a strategic presence that cannot easily be bypassed unless the geopolitical balance along Yemen’s western coastline changes, from Hodeidah Governorate to Bab al-Mandab and the islands overlooking the strait.
The real question, therefore, is no longer whether the Houthis have achieved a military advance inside Yemen. The more consequential question is whether Iran, through the Houthis, has succeeded in transforming the Yemeni coast and Bab al-Mandab into a new strategic front capable of partially compensating for the decline of its influence elsewhere and giving it the ability to exert simultaneous pressure on both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
The struggle over Yemen’s western coast is therefore no longer merely a battle for a city or a stretch of coastline. In light of these developments, it has become part of a broader contest over who possesses the ability to shape the geography of maritime corridors and who can turn that geography into an instrument of political and economic influence within the regional and international systems.
What Options Does the Legitimate Government Have to Retake Mokha?
The preceding analysis brings us to the options still available to Yemen’s internationally recognized government. In recent days, multiple narratives and explanations have emerged regarding what happened along the western coast. These range from claims of betrayal and security breaches to accounts attributing the developments to operational mistakes, fragmented decision-making, or inadequate support for the front lines. Others argue that the problem is deeper than any of these explanations.
In practical terms, retaking Mokha does not appear to be a purely military decision that can simply be taken by launching another offensive. Attempting to repeat the same offensive structure and the same mistakes could produce an even more costly outcome. The first priority should therefore be to rebuild unified political and military decision-making and determine whether retaking Mokha is an immediate priority or part of a broader strategy for reorganizing the front lines.
This raises the fundamental question of which forces the legitimate government can rely upon to mount a new campaign. Should it depend on the National Resistance forces previously associated with Tareq Saleh, a member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, in the form they existed before the recent developments? These forces have reportedly experienced significant fragmentation and may no longer constitute a cohesive formation that can be treated as the spearhead of a new offensive. Some elements may have repositioned toward Taiz or Marib, returned to fighting alongside the Houthis, or withdrawn from the military scene altogether.
At the same time, southern forces such as the Giants Brigades and the Nation’s Shield remain capable, in terms of numbers, experience, and combat effectiveness, of reorganizing their ranks. The problem, however, is that these forces face a longstanding crisis of trust with government forces or formations whose personnel are drawn from northern Yemen. This complicates efforts to regroup them and deploy them in a new campaign and would require carefully calibrated political and military arrangements.
There are also army units linked to the Taiz and Marib fronts, which have demonstrated some of the strongest resistance to the Houthis over the years. A significant portion of these forces, however, is directly or indirectly associated with the Islah Party or with military commanders and tribal figures perceived as being affiliated with it.
This creates another, more complex dilemma: can southern forces and forces associated with Islah truly be brought together in a single operations room, under a unified command, and into the same battle?
The question is not theoretical. Years of war have generated deep mistrust among these components, and some formations may enter the battle carrying greater fears and suspicions of one another than confidence in a common military objective. The mutual suspicions reportedly evident among some southern and other forces during the recent fighting illustrate the scale of the problem that must be addressed before any new offensive can be contemplated.
The legitimate government therefore faces several options. It could attempt to rebuild a unified military force capable of integrating the existing formations, although time may not permit such an undertaking. It could instead distribute roles among the various forces so that formations marked by conflict or mistrust are not forced to fight side by side. Alternatively, it could establish a joint operations command that transcends partisan and regional divisions and clearly defines who commands, who fights, and who provides support.
The Yemeni government consequently faces a dual test: retaking Mokha on the one hand and preventing the collapse of other fronts on the other. If the Marib and Taiz fronts have been among the most important lines of resistance to the Houthis in recent years, indiscriminately redeploying their forces toward the western coast could create a vacuum elsewhere that may be no less dangerous than the loss of Mokha itself.
The issue therefore becomes one of strategic prioritization. Should the legitimate government begin with an operation to retake Mokha, or should it first reorganize its military structure, rebuild trust among its various components, define the role of each front, and only then determine the appropriate timing for retaking the coast?
Perhaps the most rational option is for the next battle not to be framed as Tareq’s battle, the South’s battle, or Islah’s battle, but rather as the battle of the Yemeni state to recover its territory. Yet achieving this appears difficult under the current circumstances of overlapping interests, conflicting priorities, and accumulated disputes.
If this question is not resolved, the effort to retake Mokha could become merely another attempt to manage the crisis rather than resolve it, potentially reproducing the very mistakes that led to its fall.
The significance of the latest development lies in the fact that it moves the Houthis from being an actor capable of attacking maritime traffic to one increasingly close to becoming an actor capable of shaping the maritime environment and raising the cost of passage through it. This is an important strategic distinction.
Full control of Bab al-Mandab is not necessary for the Houthis to influence shipping. It is sufficient for the area to become sufficiently high-risk that shipping companies are forced to alter their routes, insurers raise premiums, or vessels choose to sail around the Cape of Good Hope. Previous experience has demonstrated that the mere threat posed by the Houthis can generate significant disruption to navigation in the Red Sea.
Accordingly, the strategic value of Houthi control of the coast lies not only in their possession of positions from which missiles and drones can be launched, but also in their ability to transform Yemen’s geography into a tool of pressure on the global economy and a lever that can, when necessary, serve Iran’s interests without producing meaningful benefits for Yemen as a state, economy, or society.
The strategic importance of Bab al-Mandab has increased further amid disruption to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, facing threats to its exports through the Gulf, has relied more heavily on transporting oil through its territory to Red Sea ports as a geographic alternative to Hormuz. Consequently, the threat to Bab al-Mandab cannot be viewed separately from the Hormuz crisis. It directly threatens one of the alternatives available to Riyadh for bypassing disrupted or closed routes.
This becomes particularly significant when the initial indications of the messages the Houthis have attempted to convey are taken into account. These messages emphasize that the Houthis are capable of protecting the waterway and ensuring freedom of navigation for the United States and the West, while simultaneously threatening to use their ability to influence maritime traffic to impose pressure on Saudi exports and ports. This is where interests that work against Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the wider region converge.
If this perception becomes entrenched, the Houthis could gradually transform from an actor viewed primarily as a source of threats to international shipping into a de facto power seeking to present itself as indispensable to future arrangements concerning the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. This produces one of the most dangerous strategic equations of all, narrowing Saudi Arabia’s room for maneuver by bringing the two threats together at the same time.
Iran’s Strategic Victory
It would, of course, be inaccurate to claim that Iran now directly controls Bab al-Mandab. The reality is more complex. What matters more than direct control, however, is that Tehran now possesses, through a local armed ally operating with the involvement of Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel and advisers, the capacity to influence the security of the strait without deploying Iranian forces there directly. This is precisely the essence of the Iranian model of influence, which relies on proxies and local allies.
Iran does not necessarily need to administer Bab al-Mandab directly. It is sufficient for its Houthi ally to possess the ability to threaten vessels, disrupt maritime traffic, target energy-related infrastructure, and increase the cost of passage through the Red Sea. Recent analyses have suggested that the Houthi advance along Yemen’s southwestern coast is consistent with a broader Iranian objective of increasing pressure on maritime traffic and energy flows and creating a bargaining instrument that complicates the strategic calculations of the U.S.-Iran confrontation.
This helps explain the significance of years of Iranian support for the Houthis. The movement was not merely a bargaining tool for Tehran within the Yemeni war. It represented a long-term geopolitical investment in an area adjacent to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. Iran now appears to be reaping the strategic dividends of that investment and partnership.
Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Dilemma
Saudi Arabia may be the actor most exposed to the consequences of this transformation. The Kingdom is no longer confronting merely an armed group along its southern border. It now faces the possibility that Yemen’s western coastline could become a strategic pressure point affecting its economy, maritime security, and oil exports.
The latest development has unfolded alongside reports of an attack on the Saudi East-West Pipeline by drones launched from Iraqi territory, resulting in its temporary closure as a precaution. The significance of the incident lies in the pipeline’s role as one of Saudi Arabia’s principal alternatives for bypassing the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
The strategic picture is therefore becoming clearer: pressure on oil flows to the east through Hormuz, pressure on the western export route through threats originating from Iraqi militias, and a threat to the maritime corridor at Bab al-Mandab through the Houthi advance. In this way, Iran has increased the cost of a conflict in which it has already suffered substantial losses.
The rapid Houthi advance cannot be explained by military strength alone. Field accounts suggest that a number of positions fell without direct fighting and that withdrawals described by the internationally recognized government as “tactical” repositioning effectively turned into rapid retreat, resulting in the fragmentation of defensive lines. Confusion and rumors promoted by the Houthis also appear to have created a psychological environment that encouraged some units to withdraw before engaging in direct confrontation, allowing the Houthis to exploit the collapse rapidly and expand their territorial gains.
The main causes of the breakdown can be summarized in the fragmentation of anti-Houthi forces and the absence of unified operational command. These forces operated under different names and agendas, ranging from government troops to the National Resistance and various local formations, without a single operations room capable of managing the battle in an integrated manner.
This was compounded by reported breaches of the communications system, which allegedly allowed the Houthis access to sensitive operational movements and plans. In addition, the presence of personnel and forces geographically connected to Houthi-controlled areas within some government formations reportedly created security and intelligence vulnerabilities that weakened military decision-making and increased the likelihood of infiltration and internal betrayal.
A fourth factor was the absence of adequate air cover and effective coordination between ground forces and air support. Field units operated without sufficient aerial protection or an intelligence and support system capable of securing their advance and preventing the Houthis from exploiting vulnerabilities.
When these factors converged—fragmented command structures, compromised communications, security vulnerabilities within some formations, the absence of air support, and psychological warfare and misinformation—the fighting shifted from a localized retreat into a cascading collapse. The speed with which areas fell therefore does not necessarily indicate decisive Houthi military superiority as much as it reveals the fragility of the government front’s operational structure and its failure to transform multiple forces into a unified and resilient defensive system.
Riyadh’s Options
Saudi Arabia’s current dilemma appears highly complex. Returning to a broad war aimed at retaking the western coast could give Riyadh an opportunity to alter the balance of power, but it also carries the risk of reproducing the prolonged Yemeni war, which continued for years without producing a decisive military outcome.
Accepting the new status quo, by contrast, could allow Houthi control of the coast to become an established reality that would be increasingly difficult to reverse. Riyadh therefore faces a difficult intersection of choices and constraints: military escalation would carry a high cost; negotiations could grant the Houthis strategic gains; while failure to act could entrench the emerging reality.
These choices are made more difficult by the U.S. position. According to President Trump’s reported remarks, Washington has so far rejected direct involvement in a new campaign against the Houthis. In commenting on the recent developments, the U.S. president indicated that the Houthis had communicated with the American side, stating that they did not wish to enter into a war with the United States and were committed to protecting U.S. interests.
In political and strategic terms, this message carries implications beyond a simple effort at de-escalation. The Houthis appear to be seeking to present themselves to the United States and the international community as a force capable of regulating maritime security and protecting international interests, while simultaneously consolidating their position as a de facto actor whose role cannot be ignored in any future arrangements concerning Yemen, the Red Sea, and Bab al-Mandab.
One of the most important consequences of the crisis is therefore becoming clear: Saudi Arabia is facing not only the Houthi challenge but also a test of the ability of the U.S. security umbrella to operate effectively across multiple fronts at the same time.
From Yemen to International System Security
The true significance of this development is not confined to Saudi Arabia or Yemen. Disruption at Bab al-Mandab directly affects the Suez Canal and global supply chains. Previous Houthi attacks have demonstrated that reduced shipping activity in the Red Sea can force vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, with the resulting increases in distance, fuel consumption, insurance costs, and delivery times.
The Houthis have therefore become capable, as a result of their geographic position and military capabilities, of transforming a local conflict into a source of pressure on the global economy. It is here that the geopolitical value of the Houthi card for Iran becomes most apparent.
The most dangerous development in the current situation is not merely the Houthis’ advance deeper into Yemeni territory. It is their transition from a land-based force concentrated in northern Yemen into a force increasingly approaching the ability to exercise direct geopolitical influence over one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
Through its Yemeni ally, Iran has thus achieved a strategic gain at a moment when the rest of its regional network is facing unprecedented pressure.
At the same time, the future of this gain will not be determined solely by Houthi control of Mokha or Mayyun Island. It will depend on the Houthis’ ability to convert geographic control into a sustainable capacity to disrupt maritime traffic, on Saudi Arabia and its allies’ ability to rebuild a coherent military and political front, and on the willingness of the United States to bear the cost of protecting the maritime order in the Red Sea and the Gulf simultaneously.
The central conclusion is that the battle for Bab al-Mandab is no longer simply a battle for a Yemeni city or a strip of coastline. It is a struggle over who possesses the ability to influence the movement of energy and trade between Asia and Europe and who can use maritime geography as an instrument of international competition.
If the current situation persists, the greatest danger is not that the Houthis will physically close Bab al-Mandab tomorrow. It is that Bab al-Mandab may remain legally open while becoming practically constrained by fear, risk, and cost.
At that point, Iran will have achieved one of its most important geopolitical objectives: acquiring the ability to exert pressure on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula, from Hormuz in the east to Bab al-Mandab in the south, through a combination of direct capabilities and regional proxies.
This is what makes the current development in Yemen far greater than another round in the Yemeni war. It is a new test of the regional balance of power in the Middle East and of the international system’s capacity to protect the maritime corridors upon which the global economy depends.
